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That there is in these United States a well known, defined,
and to thinking minds an exceedingly dangerous divorce evil,
that it has long been proclaimed against, and with growing
voice, by pulpit and press, and that religious organizations and
learned societies have discussed and denounced it, is well known,
as it is also to our profession that for more than twenty years the
American Bar Association has had under consideration sugges-
tions for its legislative remedy. The evil can be stated in no
stronger terms than that it casts its shadow on every community,
and that annually there are now granted in the United States
more than 70,ooo divorces, increasing from 25,535 in 1886, and
from 9,937 in i867, thus greatly exceeding the proportion of
growth in our population, while, in comparison with other civil-
ized nations, the cloud grows darker; England making less than
Boo such decrees in a single year, while the proportion in Ger-
many, and even in France, is far below the United States. Per-
haps the most influential and in terms the strongest denunciation
of this national evil was formulated by the Inter-Church Confer-
ence of last autumn, but yet, like all else that had been said, and
so well said, though nowhere with greater emphasis that in that
Conference, nothing practical has heretofore been accomplished
providing a means whereby the disease may be cured, save only
that public attention has been called to the dangerous situation,
and thereby public opinion has been aroused to the necessity of
remedial action.
It may well be the boast of our commonwealth that, acting
through her legislative and executive departments, the State of
Pennsylvania was the first to take such action as will secure
practical results, and do much and probably all that can be
accomplished, to eradicate this great danger to our national life.
It is to be safely assumed that the one who approved was also the
one who inspired the act of March i6th, 19o5, whereby our Chief
Executive was authorized to appoint a commission to codify our
present laws on the subject of divorce, and, with him, to act as
delegates to a Congress of the states to devise a uniform statute
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upon this question. In accordance with Governor Pennypacker's
initiative and invitation, the governors of forty-two states
appointed delegates to a Congress as unique in its assembling as
it was important in its declared object of meeting. Excepting the
Convention of 1787 which created our Federal Constitution-and
where but five states were represented at one time-no official
gathering has ever been held in the United States save, of course,
our National Congress, at which there were representatives hold-
ing the credentials of the governors of the states, while to this
Convention delegates were appointed by all the states except
South Carolina (which having no divorce law, declined the invi-
tation), Mississippi and Nevada. That the Congress should meet
in Washington was universally acceptable, and public interest
was aroused in anticipation of its organization, discussion and
resolutions.
It is apparent that no little labor, as well as extensive cor-
respondence, was involved in bringing this Congress together, as
also in making the necessary arrangements for its meetings and
accommodations, and in preparing for its work. The practical
side of this question was handled by a Committee of Arrange-
ments, consisting of the delegates from Pennsylvania, from the
District of Columbia, and of the chairman of the Committee on
Uniform Legislation of the American Bar Association, who was
also one of the delegates, Mr. Eaton, of Rhode Island. It will
not be immodest to state that the greater part of this labor fell
upon the Pennsylvania delegates, of whom the distinguished sec-
retary of the Pennsylvania Bar Association, William H. Staake,
Esq., of Philadelphia, as chairman of this committee, was the
most indefatigable. The success of the Congress and the
smoothness with which it moved along were in a large measure
due 'to his executive ability, capacity for management of details,
and his never-failing tact and courtesy.
Preparatory to the meeting of the Congress, and in order that
its work might be laid out with-some system, as well as to con-
serve the time of its delegates, the representatives of this com-
monwealth, in pursuance of what they believed to be the duties
imposed upon them by virtue of their appointment, and realizing
that no other state had probably taken up this work with the same
thoroughness, took upon themselves the formulation of all such
matters as they felt would properly and intelligently present to
the Congress, when it assembled, the various points upon which,
after seven months of arduous labor, the commissioners from
Pennsylvania believed uniformity of results might be obtained.
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This preliminary work of the Pennsylvania delegation, so far as
laid before the Congress, consisted of three matters:
First. A printed compilation of the laws of every state and
territory upon the subject of divorce.
Second. A "Declaration of Principles," ethical and legal,
underlying the problem of divorce, and, indirectly, the question
of marriage, which, as all of the delegates present recognized,
lies at the root of all the evil involved.
Third. An outline skeleton of a uniform divorce code, ex-
pressing in concrete form the abstract principles in the above
mentioned declarations.
To these principles, covered under the general head of seven-
teen resolutions, reference will soon be made, it being sufficient
to say now that not only were these suggestions courteously
received by the Congress-and there were few others presented,
except as additional or supplemental-but that they were prac-
tically adopted by the Congress.
It may be of interest at this point to make some reference to
the Congress itself, and to the personnel of the delegates, and to
give a short review of the proceeding. Organized on February
xgth, 19o6, in the spacious hall of the New Willard Hotel, in
Washington, the delegates from forty-one states and the District
of Columbia answered to the roll call, numbering, all told, over
one hundred, and including the names of distinguished jurists,
lawyers and clergymen from ail parts of the Union. Naturally,.
as the questions involved were primarily of a legal character, a
large majority of the delegates were men learned in the law.
Among these may be named the Governors of Pennsylvania and
Delaware, the Lieutenant-Governor of Indiana, United States
Senator Sutherland of Utah; Vice-Chancellor Emery and United
States Judge Lanning of New Jersey; Prof. Gardner of Harvard
University; Dean Huffcut of the Cornell Law School; Mr. Justice
Jaggard of the Supreme Court of Minnesota; the Hon. John H.
Stiness, lately Chief Justice of Rhode Island; and Amasa M.
Eaton of the same state; John C. Richberg and the Hon. John
P. McGoorty of Chicago; Hon. Seneca N. Taylor of St. Louis; F.
H. Busbee of North Carolina; R. T. Barton and John G. Pollard
of Virginia; Hon. Alfred Wolcott of Michigan; Talcott H. Russell
of Connecticut; President H. K. Warren of Yaukton University,
South Dakota; and Dean Sterling of the University of South
Dakota; Hon. Roscoe Pound, Dean of the Nebraska Law School;
Ralph W. Breckinridge and John L. Webster of Omaha; Judge
Dabney of California; Charles F. Libby of Maine; Judge Thorn-
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ton and W. 0. Hart of Louisiana; and Otto J. Kraemer of Oregon.
Among the delegates other than those of the legal profession may
be included Bishop Gailor of the Episcopal Diocese of Tennessee;
Bishop Shanley of the Roman Catholic Church of North Dakota;
the Rev. Dr. Minton of New Jersey, formerly Moderator of the
General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church; the Rev. Dr.
Alex. J. D. Haupt of the Lutheran Church of Minnesota; the
Rev. Dr. Samuel W. Dike of Massachusetts; and the Rev. Ira
Landreth of Tennessee. Upon motion of the delegates from
Nebraska, seconded by the delegates from Rhode Island, the
Honorable Samuel W. Pennypacker, Governor of Pennsylvania,
very properly styled the father of the Congress, was unanimously
chosen as its President. His inaugural address was the key note
of the convention and set the pace for its work, while his genius
as a presiding officer, as well ashis courtesy and ability in handling
the Congress, won for him unstinted praise.
The organization completed, the Congress, upon his invita-
tation, called in a body upon the President of the United States,
and at its next session received the delegates from the Inter-
Church Conference, headed by their chairman, the venerable
Bishop Doane of Albany, and including Bishop Wilson of the
Methodist Episcopal Church South; the Rev. Dr. Roberts and
Rev. Dr. Dickey of the Presbyterian Church; and John E. Par-
sons and Francis Lynde Stetson, leaders of the bar of New York.
The resolutions and the skeleton code prepared by the dele-
gates from Pennsylvania were submitted to the Committee on
Resolutions, of which, Walter George Smith, Esq. of Philadel-
phia, was chairman, and upbn whom devolved a large portion of
the labors on the floor of the Convention in bringing these reso-
lutions before the Congress. It is but just to say that the results
arrived at were in a large measure due to his unusual qualities,
both of mind and character. For tact, graciousness of manner,
breadth of view, surbordination of his own personal convictions
in.the interests of society, for earnestness of purpose, for absolute
honesty and fairness, not only to the Congress but to his own
conscience, and for his comprehensive grasp of all the questions
involved, a stronger man could hardly have been found to lead
the debates and discussions of the Congress.
It was agreed among the rules of order that the votes upon
the resolutions presented should be by states. It was inspiring,
as well as interesting, to listen to the call of the states, from
Alabama to Wyoming, and to observe the chairman of each dele-
gation arise and announce the vote of his respective common-
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wealth. Such an assembly, as has already been said, has hither-
to been unknown in the history of our country, and hence this
Congress attracted much attention, as well for the importance of
its labors as for the satisfactory results accomplished.
The Congress adopted eighteen basic resolutions, and by a
very large majority of the states. These resolutions will be the
foundation of a uniform code, of which more will be said here-
after, but for the present we will discuss the resolutions them-
selves.
The first resolution was as to federal legislation, and was
unanimously adopted, as follows:
I. It is the sense of the Congress that no federal divorce law
is feasible, and that'all efforts to secure the passage of a constitu-
tional amendment, -a necessary prerequisite, -would be futile.
The Congress recognized that under the Constitution
of the United States the federal government has no juris-
diction of the questions of Marriage aid Divorce, and
was of opinion that in matters of such purely domestic
concern it should have none, and that it would be practi-
cally impossible to secure an amendment to the Consti-
tution in this regard for many reasons. In the first
place, the question of States Rights as against a central-
ized form of government would be involved; secondly, in
order to secure a constitutional amendment it would be
necessary to secure the approval of two-thirds of both
branches of Congress to the submission of such an
amendment to the states, or else the applicatioa of the
legislatures of two-thirds of the states therefore, and
the subsequent ratification by the legislatures of three-
fourths of the states; thirdly, because even if such an
ametidment were to be submitted to the legislatures of
the various states, it would be rejected by them, either
because conservative ones like South Carolina and New
York would object to an increase of the number of
causes for absolute divorce, or because others, which
have adopted a liberal, if not lax policy in this regard,
would object to restrictions that might be imposed by
Congress.
It therefore being the sense of the Congress that the
remedies must be sought through the legislatures of the
various states, the following General Resolutions em-
bodying the essential principles relating to the matter
were almost unanimously adopted:
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x. All suits for divorce should be brought and prosecuted
only in the state where the plaintiff or defendant had a bona fide
residence.
The reasons controlling the action of the Congress
in adopting this resolution were practically as follows:
Marriage being a social status of the citizens of each
state, and therefore properly of purely domestic concern,
the remedy for offenses against that social status should
also, as far as possible, be confined to the courts of the
state in which the parties to the marriage contract had
acquired and maintained their common matrimonial
domicile, and that any proceedings for dissolution of
the status of marriage must find their sanction in the
legislation of that state. That no state should have the
right to extend its jurisdiction over the marital status of
citizens of another state; and that all attempts so to do
would, as is apparent from an examination of the decis-
ions not only of the higher courts of the various states,
but of the United States Supreme Court, result in con-
fusion both as to the marriage status of the parties
themselves and as to the property rights of such parties
and their heirs. Also that by confining the jurisdiction
of the courts of each state in suits for divorce to its
own citizens, or to those who have acquired citizenship
by a bona fide residence for a prescribed term of years,
the evils arising from migratory divorces would be in a
measure abolished.
2. a. When the courts are given cognizance of suits where
the plaintiff was domiciled in a foreign jurisdiction at the time
the cause of complaint arose, it should be insisted that relief will
not be given unless the cause of. divorce was included among
those recognized in such foreign domicile.
b. When the courts are given cognizance of suits where the
defendant was domiciled in a foreign jurisdiction at the time the
cause of complaint arose, it should be insisted that relief by abso-
lute divorce will not be given unless the cause of divorce was
included among those recognized in such foreign domicile.
The evil of migratory divorce lies partly in the
extreme to which the doctrine of the right of each state
to legislate exclusively as to all of its domestic concerns
has been carried, and the unwillingness on the part of
such states to recognize the principle of inter-state com-
ity as embodied in Article IV, Section i, of the Constitu-
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tion of the United States, which provides that "Full
faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public
acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other
state ;" and partly to the fact that both the larger num-
ber of causes for absolute divorce prescribed by many of
the states, the shorter term of residence required there-
in, and the loose administration of the existing laws, has
in the past afforded unlimited opportunity for fraudulent
and collusive divorces, and for divorces where jurisdic-
tion of only one of the parties was obtained by the
court of the-state to which the applicant applied for
relief. Therefore, the Congress felt that it should be
presumed that each state would carefully protect the
rights of its own citizens, and that no person of honest
intentions should seek relief in any other court than
that in which they had the right to bring suit by reason
of their common domicile; and that each state, in pro-
ceedings for divorce, just as in other legal proceedings,
should take cognizance of the legal status of the parties
in the state where the marriage relation had existed.
3. a. Where jurisdiction for absolute divorce depends upon
the residence of the plaintiff, not less than two years residence
should be required on the part of the plaintiff who has changed
his or her state domicile since the cause of divorce arose.
b. Where the jurisdiction for absolute divorce depends
upon the residence of the defendant, not less than two years resi-
dence should be required on the part of the defendant who has
changed his or her state domicile since the cause of divorce arose.
There is, and can be, no constitutional or legal restric-
tion placed upon the rights of every individual to acquire
a residence and citizenship in any part of the United
States for any purpose whatever. But just as the right
of suffrage cannot be acquired in any state except after
a prescribed term of residence and upon other condi-
tions, so each state may prescribe the terms and con-
ditions upon which it will permit former non-residents
to invoke the jurisdiction of its courts to grant relief from
the real or supposed hardships of a social status that, in
its practical and moral relations, lies at the bottom not
only of the welfare of the social condition of each state,
but of the country at large. Therefore the Congress
has suggested in the above resolution that no proceedings
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in divorce can be commenced unless either the plaintiff
or defendant who has changed his or her domicile
since the cause of divorce arose has resided in the new
state for at least two years
The foregoing three resolutions relate, as will be ap-
parent, to the question of jurisdiction of the courts in
divorce preceedings, and, in the judgment of all who
considered the question, will go far to abolish the most
serious evils of divorce.
4. An innocent and injured party, husband or wife, seeking a
divorce, should not be compelled to ask for a dissolution of the
bonds of matrimony, but should be allowed, at his or her option, at
any time, to apply for a divorce from bed and board. Therefore,
divorces a mensa should be retained where already existing, and
provided for in states where no such rights exist.
As is well known, the Roman Catholic Church recog-
nizes no ground for absolute divorce for post-nuptial
causes, but only a legal separation, or a it is called in Eng-
land, and in this country, divorce a mensa et thoro.
Many in the Episcopal Church both clergy 'and laity,
hold that the marriage tie is indissoluble for any cause,
while the canon law of that Church denies the validity of
divorce save for the cause of adultery, and such are the
conscientious scruples of many members of other denomi-
nations.
South Carolina recognizes no cause whatever for di-
vorce of any kind. New York and the District of Colum-
bia recognize adultery alone as a cause for absolute di-
vorce. While the principle of the individual right of con-
tract between any two persons of opposite sexes to enter
into the marriage relation has been carried, in theory, by
many; to include also the right of terminating such relation
at the will or pleasure of either of the parties, yet the best
legal, philosophical and religious thought of all civilized
nations recognizes the fact that a marriage relation once
entered in becomes a social status or relation,--just as
much as the relation of parent and child,--over which so-
ciety, either through the Church or the State, has a right
to assume control for its own protection. Since in this
country the legal right to control the matter of divorce is
denied to the Church, and that function rests solely with
the State, it was felt, and unanimously agreed, that the
State should recognize the scruples of the large minority
412"'
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of the citizens of this country who are opposed to absolute
diivorce, notwithstanding the fact that many states, espec-
ially in the West, do not recognize divorces a inensa. The
resolution as adopted simply leaves it optional whether the
innocent and injurd party shall apply for an absolute di-
vorce or a limited divorce, and the privilege is given to
the husband as well as to the wife. One strong argument
in favor of limited divorce is that it leaves the door open
for a subsequent reconciliation.
5. The causes for divorce existing by legislative enactment
may be classed into groups that would be approved by the common
consent of all the communities represented in this Congress, or at
least substantially so. These causes should be restricted to offenses
by one party to the marriage contract against the other of so serious
a character as to defeat the objects of the marital relation, and they
should never be left to the discretion of a court, but in all cases
should be clearly and specifically enumerated in the statute. Uni-
formity in this branch of the law is much to be desired, but the
evils arising from diverse causes in the different states will be very
greatly abated if migratory divorces are prohibited. The princi-
ples enumerated in this paragraph speak for themselves, and need
not be elaborated.
6. While the following causes for annulment of the marriage
contract, for divorce from the bonds of matrimony, and for legal
separation or divorce a mensa, seem to be in accordance with the
legislation of a large number of American states, this Congress, de-
siring to see the number of cases reduced rather than increased,
recommends that no additional causes should be recognized in any
state; and in those states where causes are restricted no change is
called for.
a. Causes for Annulment of the Marriage Contract:
I. Impotency.
2. Consanguinity and affinity, properly limited.
3. Existing marriage.
4. Fraud, force or coercion.
5. Insanity, unknown to the other party.
b. Causes for Divorce a. v. m.:
I. Adultery.
2. Bigamy.
3- Conviction of crime in certain classes of cases.
4. Intolerable cruelty.
5. Wilful desertion for two years.
6. Habitual drunkenness.
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c. Causes for Legal Separation, or Divorce a. m.:
i. Adultery
2. Intolerable cruelty.
3. Wilful desertion for two years.
4. Hopeless insanity of husband.
5. Habitual drunkenness
This resolution distinguishes clearly between causes for
annulment of the marriage contract, which in all cases are
ante-nuptial, and causes of divorce a vinculo or a mensa,
which in all cases are post-nuptial.
No attempt was made by the Congress in adopting this
resolution to dictate to any state what causes of annulment
or divorce it should permit; it being recognized that each
community has the right to legislate for its own citizens in
all matters of purely domestic concern. The resolution,
therefore, simply expresses a statement of fact, namely,
that the causes specified seem to conform to the general
class of grounds for divorce recognized by the various
states of the Union, and they are expressed in general
terms. As stated above, two or three of the states recog-
nize no other cause than adultery as a ground for absolute
divorce. Other states permit many more. Some states do
not recognize divorce a mensa. Many states, in-
cluding Pennsylvania, do not recognize habitual drunk-
enness among the causes for either kind of divorce, possi-
bly because dipsomania is regarded more as a curable dis-
ease, if wisely and properly treated both by the family and
the medical profession, than as a positive breach of the
marriage contract; possibly, because it has been felt that,
unless accompanied by such conduct as would rise to the
plane of intolerable cruelty, it should not be made a sub-
stantive cause of divorce. Many states do not include
post-nuptial insanity as a cause of divorce although
in Pennsylvania, at the last session of its legisla-
ture, it was, through probable misconception, added to the
list of the causes already existing.
The enumeration of the various causes in this resolu-
tion will in nowise compel the state of New York, or the
District of Columbia, for instance, to increase the number
of its causes for absolute divorce, nor will it forbid other
states to add such causes as the peculiar conditions of so-
ciety within the limits of such states may seem to require.
But it was the strongly expressed hope, and almost con-
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viction, of the delegates that the ultimate result of the
present movement, which found voice in the Congress, will
be towards a gradual restriction, rather than an enlarge-
ment of the causes of divorce.
7. If conviction for crime should be made a cause for divorce,
it should be required that such conviction has been followed by a
continuous imprisonment for at least two years, or in the case of in-
determinate sentence, one year; and that such conviction has been
the result of trial in some one of the states of the Union, or in
a federal court; or in some one of the countries or courts subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States or in some foreign country,
granting a trial by jury, followed by an equally long term of im-
prisonment.
Conviction for crime is very generally recognized
throughout a majority of the states as a substantive cause
for divorce. The language of the codes of the various
states differs very greatly in this regard, some requiring
imprisonment for life, others imprisonment in a peniten-
tiary, others conviction of an infamous crime, and some few
imprisonment for one year only. The resolution as finally
adopted seemed quite conservative in its terms, and was
further framed so as to require that the offending criminal
should have the benefit of a fair jury trial before the addi-
tional penalty of a decree in divorce should be added to
the sentence for his crime.
8. A decree should not be granted a. v. m. for insanity, aris-
ing after marriage.
As stated above, post-nuptial insanity has been recog-
nized in some states as a cause for divorce a vinculo; and
Pennsylvania, in 1905, added itself to the list; but the Con-
gress, by a vote of thirty states to one, placed itself squarely
upon record as opposed to this as a proper ground for di-
vorce. Lawyers, clergymen, physicians and laymen all uni-
ted in expressing their abhorrence of permitting a mental
disease depending on no voluntary, wilful breach of the
marriage contract, arising often, in the case of the wife, as
a result of the marriage itself, to be placed upon the same
footing as adultery, cruelty, crime or desertion. The law
as well as the Church, in theory, recognizes the marriage
relation as indissoluble, and that it can be severed only by
reason of the fact that some cases of positive wrong-doing
by one of the parties. utterly defeat the purposes and possi-
bility of continuance of the marriage relation. If insanity
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should be recognized as a cause of divorce it would open
the door to divorce for all sorts of diseases, where the duty
of sustaining the marital relation has become burdensome,
at the will of either party.
9. In those states where desertion is a cause for divorce, it
should never be recognized as a cause unless it is willful, and is
persisted in for a period of at least two years.
Desertion is an economic rather than a moral offense
against the marriage relation, and while a number of the
states, where the population is migratory and the condi-
tions are unsettled, have recognized one year's desertion as
sufficient ground for divorce, yet the Congress felt that
progress rather than retrogression should be the rule laid
down, and accordingly recommended that the period of
desertion should cover at least two years.
The foregoing five resolutions relate plainly to causes
for divorce, and cover the third general branch of the ques-
tions before the Congress.
The following nine resolution relate more particularly
to methods of procedure.
xo. A divorce should not be granted unless the defendant
has been given full and fair opportunity, by notice brought home to
him, to have his day in court, when his residence is known or can
be ascertained.
A widely. recognized stigma upon the courts of this
country consists in the fact that either through careless-
ness, or sympathy with plaintiffs invoking the aid of their
jurisdiction, or through lax interpretation and administra-
tion of existing laws, they will entertain divorce cases and
grant decrees in divorce without having acquired jurisdic-
tion of the person of both parties, or even of the subject
matter; and it was felt by the Congress that a valuable
check would be placed upon such widely prevailing lax-
ness, if each state should require jurisdiction of the per-
son of the defendant to be secured by other means than pub-
lication in a local paper which would never be apt to come
to the eyes of the defendant. A further important legal
question is involved in this resolution, one that has been
before the courts of the various states, and *of the United
States Supreme Court, many times, namely, that no state
can exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction; and that unless
jurisdiction of the person of the defendant be legally ac-
quired by service of process within the confines of the state
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where the proceedings are begun, no decree in divorce will
be valid beyond the limits of that state. Hence, it was
deemed most desirable, not only for the protection of the
parties themselves, but of their property rights, to declare
in positive terms that no person should have a decree
entered against him without having had his day in court.
ii. Any one named as co-respondent should in all cases be
given an opportunity to intervene.
In a few of the states, as in England, a party charged
as co-respondent must be named in the libel or complaint,
and, if falsely charged, has an opportunity to defend and
vindicate his or her good name. It seemed to the Congress
that so simple a personal right should, in the interests of
justice, be given in all such cases.
12. Hearings and trials should always be before the court, and
not before any delegated representative of it, and in all uncontested
divorce cases, and in any other divorce case where the court may
deem it necessary or proper, a disinterested attorney should be
assigned by the court to actively defend the case.
This resolution provoked much discussion and some
opposition, especially on the part of states where divorce
proceedings are heard and tried only before the higher
courts, whose duties are so numerous and exacting as to
render it almost impossible for them to take the volumi-
nous testimony of witnesses and which courts, therefore,
have adopted a custom of referring such cases to stand-
ing or special masters in divorce. The formation of the
marriage contract is almost always attended with more or
less publicity, and it was felt that if a similar publicity were
attached to the termination of the marriage relation, and
that if what are known as secret divorces could in any
measurable degree be abolished, the number of applica-
tions would very decidedly diminish, and the pernicious
idea of "easy divorce" would gradually become eliminated
from the social consciousness of every community; and
after full discussion the vote upon this resolution was
unanimous in its favor. It may not be out of place to add
that neither the adoption of this nor of any other resolution
by the Congress is binding upon any particular state; and
if a more careful consideration of divorce cases can be at-
tained in states where the higher courts alone have juris-
diction of such cases, by the appointment of reputable mas-
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ters or referees to take the testimony in the first instance,
such state may adopt that method of procedure.
13. A decree should not be granted unless the cause is shown
by affirmative proof, aside from any admissions on the part of the
respondent.
In ordinary civil cases admissions of either party
by the pleadings are sufficient, by way of estoppel, to war-
rant a decree upon the faith of such admissions. But
in cases where the social status, rather than the civil
status, of the parties is involved (the state as the represen-
tative of society, being in effect a third party to the suit),
the right to a dissolution of the marriage relation should
not be affirmed unless the causes alleged in support thereof
be made out by clear and positive proof. And to this end
the last provision of Resolution Number 12, that in any
case the court may appoint a disinterested attorney to ac-
tively defend the cause, was added.
14. A decree dissolving the marriage tie so completely as to
permit the remarriage of either party should not become operative
until the lapse of a reasonable time after hearing or trial upon the
merits of the cause. The Wisconsin, Illinois and California rule
of one year is recommended.
It is well known that a large proportion of divorces are
sought by one or both of the parties in order to a remar-
riage. The religious sentiment of the country, which has
found expression during the past few years in church con-
ventions and the press, both religious and secular, is
strongly opposed to divorce for the purpose of "trying the
experiment again." Many states have formulated this con-
viction in statutory form, and either require that the de-
cree shall be in the first instance a decree nisi, or forbid the
parties to divorce proceedings from remarriage within a
prescribed time after granting of the decree. Each method
has its merits, and the Congress, by Resolution Number 14,
did not attempt to decide which of the two methods
was preferable. The end to be attained is some form of
prohibition upon speedy remarriage; and as this resolution
was adopted unanimously, it is to be hoped that every state,
in adopting whatever form of code may be decided upon,
will incorporate such a provision therein.
15. In no case should the children born during coverture be
bastardized, excepting where they are the offspring of bigamous
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marriages, or the impossibility of access by the husband has been
proved.
Much confusion exists in the legal as well as the lay
mind as to the status of children of illegal marriages. Some
marriages are void ab initio; others merely voidable until
the decree of divorce has been entered. At common law
the children of void marriages and the children of void-
able marriages, after decree entered, were bastardized.
Such a hardship upon innocent children is repellent to the
modern moral consciousness, and many of the states
have already adopted provisions legalizing the issue of all
marriages, excepting where by no possibility could such
issue be properly treated as legitimate. This exception was
covered by this resolution in the reference to the offspring
of bigamous marriages, or where the impossibility of
access by the husband has been proved.
i6. Each state should adopt a statute embodying the princi-
ple contained in the Massachusetts act, which is as follows: "If
an inhabitant of this commonwealth goes into another state or
country to obtain a divorce for a cause which occurred here while
the parties resided here, or for a cause which would not author-
ize a divorce by the laws of this commonwealth, a divorce so ob-
tained shall be of no force or effect in this commonwealth."
A recent decision of the United States Supreme Court,
in Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S., 14, established the
principle that each state has the right to provide by statute
that its own citizens shall not be allowed to procure a di-
vorce in another state, either for a cause which occurred in
another state, of their domicile, or for a cause not author-
ized by such state. This being the latest expression of the
principle involved, the Congress embodied it in the fore-
going resolution.
17. Fraud or collusion in obtaining or attempting to obtain
divorces should be made statutory crimes by the criminal code.
This resolution needs no elucidation. Fraud always
avoids any judicial decree; but as it might never be
brought to the attention of the court, it was thought advis-
able to urge that the state be permitted, through its crim-
inal code, to take cognizance of such cases.
While this review of the resolutions adopted by the Congress is
but cursory and perhaps confusing, enough will be gathered to in-
dictate that when they are embodied in the statute laws of the states
a long step forward will have been taken toward remedying the
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present divorce evil, not so much by restricting the causes as in
the line of improvement on the question of jurisdiction and proced-
ure.
The Congress referred these resolutions to a committee of seven-
teen, to whom were added the officers of the Convention, with in-
structions to report a uniform code at another session. This larger
committee has named a sub-committee, consisting of the delegates
from Pennsylvania and Vice-Chancellor Emery of New Jersey, to
draft this code. This work is now in hand and will be ready for
the general committee during the early autumn.
The delegates from this commonwealth are also the Com-
missioners appointed under the provisions of the act of March
x6th, 19o5, to examine and codify the laws of this state relating
to the subject of divorce, and to report the result of their labors
to the governor for submission to the legislature. This work
has been in their hands for more thian seven months, and a large
amount of it has already been accomplished, involving many days
of study and consultation, and the almost continuous labors of the
special secretary of the Commission, William D. Crocker, Esq.,
of the Lycoming County Bar, whose studies in this field have been
most exhaustive, and his assistance of great value to the Com-
mission. We have also devoted much attention to the preparation
of an improved code of divorce laws for Pennsylvania, work which
will be of the greatest benefit in the preparation of the proposed
uniform code for all the states. It is sincerely hoped that the
next session of the various state legislatures will have before
them the proposed coda, and that before their adjournment itwill
have been adopted and approved by at least the larger number.
Pennsylvania has taken the lead in inaugurating this important
movement, and it may well be assumed that she will not be the
last to adopt this important reform.
C. La Rue Munson.
WILLIAMSPORT, PA.
